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Against Strong Pluralism 
 
Strong pluralists hold that not even permanent material coincidence is enough for identity, 
even in the case of purely material entities. Fine (2000) and Shoemaker (2007) are examples. 
Weak pluralists hold merely that numerically distinct things can be temporarily materially 
coincident. Lewis (1986) is an example. The argument for weak pluralism is that some 
temporarily coincident material objects differ in their actual histories. This seems about as 
uncontentious as anything in philosophy could be. The argument for strong pluralism is 
usually an appeal to the possibility of modal differences. The usual illustration of strong 
pluralism is the case (Gibbard 1975) of the all-time coincident statue (Goliath) and lump of 
clay (Lumpl). Another is Kripke’s (unpublished) case of the permanently coincident, 
unfortunately never-flowering, plant (Plant) and its stem (Stem). The argument for strong 
pluralism appeals to Leibniz’s Law. Goliath could not have survived being rolled into a ball, 
Lumpl could. They differ in their modal properties and so are distinct. Again, Stem could not 
have had a flower as a part, Plant could, so they must be distinct.
1
 
 The standard response is to deny that the modal predicate is constant in reference 
throughout the argument. So a fallacy is diagnosed .This response does not require endorsing 
a Lewisean counterpart theoretic account of de re modal predication (Lewis 1986), though 
Lewis does provide the most detailed account available of the inconstancy of modal 
predication (Noonan 1991). 
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 Of course, if strong pluralists accept the Kripke case – in which neither of the putatively distinct objects is an 
artefact – as an illustration they must also accept that there are far more than two permanently coincident entities 
present in that spatio-temporal location, and must in fact accept that wherever there is a complex material object 
there are many (more than two). Thus strong pluralists who accept this type of case as illustrating their doctrine 
must be what we might call plenitudinous pluralists. Strong pluralists who accept as illustrations only cases 
involving artefacts, like the Goliath/Lumpl case, are not so obviously committed to plenitudinous pluralism, and 
may as we shall see, deny it – at a price. 
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 So the most usual argument for strong pluralism can be rejected. But why should it 
be? What is wrong with strong pluralism? 
 I first say what is at issue between strong pluralists and their opponents. 
 Perhaps the most frequently raised objection to strong pluralism is that given that 
permanently coincident objects share the same matter arranged in the same way it is 
impossible to explain how they can be of different sorts or have different persistence 
conditions. Thus Karen Bennett (2004: 339-40) asks ,‘what grounds the difference between 
Lumpl and Goliath ... they are the same shape, the same size, made of the same parts , have 
the same history and future, are the same distance from the bagel store ... So what exactly 
makes it the case that they could have different shapes and sizes, etc.?’. Michael Burke 
(1992: 14-15) asks, ‘given the qualitative identity of these objects what explains their 
difference in sort?’  And Eric Olson (2001: 339) poses what he calls ‘the indiscernibility 
problem’: ‘by definition, materially coinciding objects are made up of exactly the same 
particles, arranged in exactly the same way, in identical surroundings. ... How could they 
have the qualitative differences constitutionalists [strong pluralists] say they have?’ 
 It is not always clear what this ‘grounding problem’ is because it is not always clear 
what is being said to be ungrounded. 
 What is the real issue, I think, is that strong pluralism offends against a supervenience 
thesis: it entails the possibility of purely material objects, even non-coincident, alike in all 
general respects – categorical, modal, counterfactual, dispositional, relational and non-
relational, past, present and future – at the microphysical level, but differing in general 
modal, counterfactual or dispositional respects at the macrophysical level. So it conflicts with 
the thesis that the general modal, counterfactual or dispositional macrophysical properties of 
material objects supervene on their general microphysical features (including those which are 
relational as well as non-relational, past and future as well as present, modal, counterfactual 
 3 
 
and dispositional as well as categorical). If the strong pluralist is right to distinguish Plant and 
Stem there may be, far away, a twin of Plant, Plant*, and a twin of Stem, Stem*, each in all 
general respects, categorical, modal, counterfactual, dispositional, relational and non-
relational, past, present and future, completely indistinguishable at the microphysical level 
from its unstarred twin (because symmetrical universes are possible). If so Stem*, like Stem, 
will be in all these respects microphysically indistinguishable from (unstarred) Plant, but 
macrophysically different in some general modal, counterfactual or dispositional respect, and 
not because it stands in the relation of constitution to Plant, since it does not.
2
  So the issue 
between strong pluralists and their opponents, we can say, is not one about the relation of 
coincidence to identity or the nature of constitution, but simply about the supervenience on 
their general microphysical properties of the general modal, counterfactual and dispositional 
macrophysical predications of material objects.  
 So why should we object to strong pluralism?  
 Consider Wittgenstein’s supposition in Zettel (608): ‘certain kinds of plant multiply 
by seed, so that a seed always produces a plant of the same kind as that from which it is 
produced – but nothing in the seed corresponds to the plant which comes from it; so that it is 
impossible to infer the properties or structure of the plant from those of the seed – this can 
only be done from the history of the seed.’ This makes sense, even though we have to 
suppose causation across a temporal gap (because a seed S1 coming from a particular plant of 
kind K1 at a time t1 causes it to develop into a certain plant of kind K1 at a time t3 even 
though in the intervening times it is intrinsically identical in all respect to another seed S2 
that comes from a particular plant of kind K2 and develops  into a plant of kind K2 at t3); 
there is, as Wittgenstein says, ‘order out of chaos’. But now suppose it is said that two seeds 
from the same kind of plant, i.e., with the same history, microphysically indistinguishable in 
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 Again, according to the strong pluralist, Goliath and distant Lumpl*, which coincides with Goliath’s twin 
Goliath*, will differ in some modal, counterfactual or dispositional respect at the macrophysical level, despite 
absolute indistinguishability in all general microphysical respects). 
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all respects (past, present and future, relational and non-relational, categorical, modal and 
dispositional), destroyed without being planted, differ in that they would have produced 
different kinds of plant if they had been planted. This is the supposition that concerns us. To 
believe it is to believe in magic – that is what it is to think that such a macrophysical 
dispositional difference does not reflect any difference at all at the microphysical level. But it 
is only ruled out by the supervenience thesis strong pluralists reject. It is exactly how Plant 
and distant Stem* are related according to them. The supposition about the seeds is absurd 
but the strong pluralist has deprived himself of an explanation of why this is so. Again, 
consider a symmetrical world of two indiscernible particles speeding away from one another. 
Is there not an accessible world in which one swerves off and the other continues straight? 
Yes. But it does not follow that either particle in the ‘straight’ world has a capacity which is 
different from that of the other (Curtis 2012, Zimmerman 1997). The supposition is absurd. 
But that is how Plant and distant Stem* must be related if the strong pluralist is right. So once 
again the strong pluralist cannot explain the absurdity.
3
 
 That is my first objection to strong pluralism. My second is an objection to the 
proposal that cases involving artefacts might exemplify it, even if it is allowed that other 
cases do. To be an artefact is just to have a relational property: to be created by intentional 
activity or to be in some way the focus of such activity. A thing which in our world has such 
a relational feature, or at least something intrinsically microphysically indistinguishable from 
such a thing, could have existed in an artefact-free world. In our world there may be, say, a 
piano, made of bits of wood and ivory and wires bound together. In another world there may 
                                                          
3
 Weak pluralists are not thus deprived of explanatory resources; they do not need to believe in magic. All they 
must say is that things which are intrinsically microphysically indistinguishable at a time (or even at all times 
they both exist) may differ in some sort and in the (modally inconstant) predicates true of them (though they can 
say that if either is of sort S the other ‘is’, in the sense of the ‘is’ of constitution, an S when they are 
indistinguishable). But to find a problem with that is to commit what the late Jonathan Lowe called (2002:370) 
‘the cinematographic fallacy’, ‘the idea ... that any qualitative differences between objects must be revealed by 
instantaneous snapshots’, and not to see that how the world is outside the temporal boundaries of a thing may be 
relevant to whether it satisfies a sortal predicate (because, in particular, sortal predicates are constrained by 
conditions of the form: ‘if x is (identical with) an S and if Rxtt* x exists at t and t*’). 
 5 
 
be an object which is microphysically intrinsically indistinguishable (with exactly the same 
microphysical particles within its boundaries, related to one another in exactly the same 
ways) created accidentally by naughty monkeys or by a freak gust of wind. Now, strong 
pluralism implies that if something is created by the appropriate intentional activity 
something else, numerically distinct but microphysically indistinguishable in all respects, 
relational and non-relational, past, present and future, is also created. So in the 
aforementioned ‘cosmic accident’ (‘naughty monkey’ or ‘freak gust of wind’) world either 
there would have been at least one fewer possessor of the actually shared intrinsic 
microphysical property than in the actual world – or else, as we shall see in a moment, 
something else, equally or more implausible, must be true. To revert to the familiar example, 
if in fact, as strong pluralism implies, Goliath and Lumpl are permanent coincidents in our 
world, there is another, artefact-free, world in which the intrinsic microphysical make-up they 
share (call it M) is still possessed. The strong pluralist has a choice about what to say about 
this world. He can say that Goliath does not exist there, even though Lumpl does, and so say 
that M is possessed in this world by fewer things than in our world. Or he can say that in the 
artefact-free world Goliath as well as Lumpl still exists, though it is not a statue there since it 
does not possess the requisite relational property of being a product of intentional activity. If 
he says the latter he must say that there are still two numerically distinct possessors of M in 
the artefact-free world. But he must also say that though neither is a statue, and though they 
are microphysically indistinguishable not merely intrinsically but completely in this world 
they, i.e., Goliath and Lumpl, differ in (some of) their macroscopic modal properties in just 
the way they do in our world where they are related as statue and coincident lump – though 
Goliath does not in this artefact-free world possess the modal properties which distinguish it 
from Lumpl because it is a statue (as the strong pluralist might wish to say of Goliath in the 
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actual world), since, of course, it is not.
4
 As I have indicated, I think that this is a completely 
implausible thing to say and it is not something a strong pluralist or even a plenitudinous 
pluralist is required to say (it perhaps will help to bring home the implausibility here to reflect 
that any complex lump of matter in any artefact-free world is intrinsically microphysically 
indistinguishable from some artefact in some artefact-containing world, so according to this 
suggestion there will be two completely microphysically indistinguishable material objects 
where any such lump is, differing in their macroscopic modal properties in  just the way some 
possible artefact and coincident lump are – though not because either of the objects is an 
artefact rather than a mere lump). But if the strong pluralist recoils from this alternative and 
says instead that Goliath does not exist in the artefact-free world he is committed to saying 
that the number of complex material objects is fewer in the artefact-free world.
5
 This also 
seems absurd. All that is true is that nothing is a statue in the absence of intentional activity 
because nothing then possesses the appropriate relational property – this is a de dicto 
conceptual truth. The number of complex material objects possessing the intrinsic 
microphysical property M is be the same in the artefact-free world, namely, one, despite the 
absence of intentional activity, given that M is instantiated at all. (Contrast the number of 
outlaws in Sherwood Forest, which may differ between two worlds just because of the fickle 
decrees of a distant king, though life goes on under the Greenwood in exactly the same way 
in both worlds – this simply reflects the difference between the concept ‘complex material 
object possessing intrinsic microphysical property M’ and the legal concept ‘outlaw’.) This 
follows from a de dicto implication of a constraint laid down by van Inwagen ‘whether 
certain objects add up to or compose a larger object does not depend on anything besides the 
spatial and causal relations they bear to one another’ (1990: 12) – and, in particular, not on 
                                                          
4
 I assume the strong pluralist will not want to say that Goliath and Lump both exist in the artefact-free world, 
but do not differ at all, even in modal respects. 
5
 If they accept Bennett’s proposal that all of the complete modal profiles possible in a given spatio-temporal 
location are instantiated there (2004: 355) they must also say, if they say that there are fewer possessors of M in 
the artefact-free world, that there are also fewer possibilities there. 
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the intentions of any creators.
6
 The de dicto implication of this constraint (stated in the 
previous footnote) seems to me platitudinous. Others agree. For example, Jon Tresan, who 
does not have a dog in this fight, arguing in favour of what he calls de dicto internalist 
cognitivism, writes (2006: 164): ‘Consider ... artefacts, such as cars. Are cars necessarily 
cars? At first glance it may seem so: how could that very thing sitting in the driveway exist 
and not be a car? And yet when we recall that being a car involves not just a certain 
arrangement of matter but certain intentions it seems that it may exist and not be a car. The 
same arrangement of the same matter brought together, by coincidence, in a universe without 
sentience, would not be a car – yet it would be numerically identical to the object now sitting 
in the driveway. So cars turn out only contingently cars after all. The naturalness of thinking 
they’re necessarily cars is due to our utter lack of interest in those circumstances in which 
they aren’t cars. Such circumstances are so unlikely we don’t bother to take note of them, and 
that may distort our modal intuitions. Likewise, I suggest, with moral beliefs’.7 What may 
cause resistance is the thought that if we create things when we make artefacts it immediately 
follows that there must be fewer things with the intrinsic microphysical make-up of Goliath 
(or a piano or car) in an artefact-free world. It does not follow, not even from a strong 
pluralist viewpoint, as we have seen, for he can say that Goliath still exists in the artefact-free 
world. And it is certainly not something a weak pluralist need or can accept. As a weak 
pluralist I accept that we do bring things, new things, into existence when we create artefacts 
(Goliath (=Lumpl)), but I deny that the intrinsic microphysical make-up of Goliath is 
instantiated by fewer things in the artefact-free world. People intentionally bring artefacts 
                                                          
6
 I read this as, ‘for any x, if the ys compose x the ys compose x in any world in which they bear to one another 
the same causal and spatial relations as in the actual world’. In a sense it expresses the necessity of composition. 
But for my purposes I need only a de dicto implication of this:  the number of possessors of the microphysical 
property in question is the same in the two worlds. 
7
 Others also find it congenial, e.g., Cameron (2007: 118): ‘ One might well balk at the thought that whether or 
not a collection of objects composes could have anything to do with external factors, such as the intentions of 
designers ... perhaps any possible answer [to the SCQ] must only concern the intrinsic properties and internal 
relations of the X’s’. 
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into existence by rearranging bits of matter (and even perhaps, in the case of art objects, 
merely by transferring integral macroscopic objects from one location to another, e.g., 
moving a piece of driftwood into an art gallery, and maybe even by mere (communally 
assented to) declaration). If instead the same bits are rearranged in the same way, remain so 
arranged for the same span of time and cease to be so arranged in exactly the same way, 
though all this happens only by accident (a freak gust of wind),
8
 then it does not follow that 
fewer things are brought into existence; all that follows is that nothing that is brought into 
existence qualifies as an artefact. The suggestion that fewer things with a particular intrinsic 
microphysical make-up exist when no external intentional agency is involved I do not believe 
(to forestall a protest: the origin of an artefact in intentional activity is not, it should be noted, 
‘origin’ in the sense Kripke had in mind when he argued for the necessity of origin; Lumpl 
and Goliath have the same Kripkean origin).
9
 Nor, as noted, is it something a strong pluralist 
is required to believe and I know of no strong pluralist who has actually explicitly endorsed 
it, when distinguished from the disjunctive claim the strong pluralist is required to make if he 
accepts cases involving artefacts as illustrations of his doctrine, that is, that either fewer 
things instantiating the complex intrinsic microphysical property in question exist in the 
artefact-free world or two microphysically completely indistinguishable things are present 
there, neither an artefact, though differing in modal macroscopic properties precisely as do a 
lump of matter and coincident artefact.
10
 So, I think, strong pluralists should not give 
                                                          
8
 A fortiori, if it is only by accident that the location of an integral macroscopic object is changed. 
9
 Why should the presence or absence of external intentional agency be so important to the number of things 
possessing a particular intrinsic microphysical make-up? Why is the presence or absence of, say, external 
agency by water not equally important? How would the argument go against someone who insisted that it was? 
10
 Of course, some strong pluralists have made claims from which it follows (given that, as they think, modal 
predication is constant). Thus Baker (1997) affirms (a) that it is a de dicto necessary truth that all statues are 
products of intentional activity and (b) that anything which is (not only a statue but) non-derivatively a statue (in 
a sense she introduces) is necessarily a statue. But she does not explicitly consider the consequence, that the 
number of material things with a particular intrinsic microphysical make-up (and hence the same Kripkean 
origin) will vary with the presence or absence of intentional activity external to the region in which that make-
up is instantiated. And the only thing she says in support of her claim that nothing which is non-derivatively a 
statue could have existed without being a statue is that a world without art objects is ontologically poorer than 
our world. So it is in a sense; there are no statues there. In the same sense a world without outlaws or husbands 
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examples involving artefacts and coincident lumps as illustrations of their doctrine, since 
doing so commits them to a disjunctive claim neither disjunct of which has any plausibility. 
 In sum, I have argued that two questions should be at the focus of, indeed, should 
replace, the debate about strong pluralism: (1) Can two spatially separated material objects, 
like Plant and distant Stem*, alike in all their general microphysical properties, differ in their 
general modal, dispositional or counterfactual macroscopic properties (is magic actually 
possible)? (2) Given a complex intrinsic microphysical property M, i.e., a property of the type 
having within its boundaries exactly such-such microphysical particles arranged in exactly 
such-and-such ways, instantiated in some spatio-temporal region, can the number of material 
things possessing M located exactly in that region (not merely the relational properties of the 
material things possessing M in that region) vary with the presence or absence of intentional 
activity taking place outside it? If the answer to (1) is negative strong pluralism is false, if the 
answer to (2) is negative cases involving artefacts cannot exemplify it unless, utterly 
implausibly, permanently coincident material objects, neither an artefact, can differ in modal 
properties in precisely the way an artefact and a non-artefact do. I think the answer is 
negative in each case. 
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